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Abstract After the collapse of communism in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, former party members were
particularly likely to start businesses and become
entrepreneurs. What remains unclear, however, is
whether this entrepreneurial activity was driven by
the resources, information, and opportunities provid-
ed by former party membership or because individ-
uals with specific individual attributes were more
likely to become Communist cadres (self-selection).
This study is the first to separate the causal effect of
former Communist party membership from self-
selection. Using individual-level Life in Transition-
III survey data and a control function approach, we
find that former Communist party membership has
facilitated business set-up but not business longevity
in Central and Eastern European countries. We also
show that people who joined the former ruling party
had fewer of the traits associated with entrepreneur-
ship such as unobservable personality traits, ability,
motivation, and entrepreneurial aptitude, and as such
were negatively self-selected. We show that former
Communist party membership still matters for
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1 Introduction
The communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE) typically forbade private enterprise as it was
incompatible with the principles of top-down command
economies. Because they severely restricted private
property and market exchange, and considered state
reliance and conformity more ethical and moral than
individualism and self-initiative, former communist
states created both institutional and cultural obstacles
to entrepreneurship (Estrin and Mickiewicz 2011;
Neimanis 1997; Ovaska and Sobel 2005).
Vibrant entrepreneurial activity is a key indicator
of the success of the marketization and democrati-
zation processes in CEE (Bateman 2000; Ovaska
and Sobel 2005). Yet progress towards an advanced
entrepreneurial society across the region has been
uneven (Sauka and Chepurenko 2017). To this day,
the negative legacy of communism is still evident in
the low entrepreneurship levels, higher fear of fail-
ure, and low cultural acceptance of entrepreneurship
in CEE compared to other parts of the world (Sauka
and Chepurenko 2017; Szerb and Trumbull 2016).
Both sub-par economic and political institutions in
some of these countries and the historical legacy of
communism that discouraged private initiative have
been barriers to entrepreneurship in CEE (Aidis and
Adachi 2007; Estrin et al. 2006; Estrin and
Mickiewicz 2011; McMillan and Woodruff 2002).
The business environment in some CEE countries
tends to be bureaucratic, highly corrupt, and dys-
functional, which creates multiple hurdles to doing
business, such as raising the administrative costs of
setting up and operating a business. Unsurprisingly,
perceptions of administrative complexities hinder
entrepreneurship in CEE (van der Zwan et al.
2011). Given that entrepreneurship improves human
welfare through contributing to economic growth,
innovation, job creation, and even well-being and
health (Kritikos 2014; Nikolova 2019; van Praag
and Versloot 2007), studying the causes of entrepre-
neurial activity is instrumental to promoting social
welfare in CEE (Berkowitz and DeJong 2005;
Campos and Coricelli 2002).
Despite extensive anecdotal evidence that people
with links to the former Communist party were
particularly likely to become entrepreneurs when
the regime changed (Karpov 2017; Kotz and Weir
2007, p.113; Shapiro 1991), the academic literature
on whether and how past experiences with commu-
nism and former Communist party membership mat-
ter for present-day entrepreneurship in CEE and the
FSU regions is scarce. While a handful of empirical
studies find that former party links matter for entre-
preneurship in CEE and the FSU (Aidis et al. 2008;
Djankov et al. 2005; Nikolova and Simroth 2015;
Rona-Tas 1994), they fail to clarify what drives the
association between former party links and present-
day entrepreneurship: whether it is the persistent
access to resources, information and opportunities
provided by the party networks, or the possibility
that people with different unobservable traits, such
as motivation, ability, or entrepreneurial aptitude,
were more likely to become party members in the
first place and subsequently entrepreneurs (self-se-
lection). The objective of our study is to shed light
on the mechanisms through which association with
the former ruling elite matters for entrepreneurship
today. We do so by separating the causal effect of
former Communist party membership from that of
self-selection. Specifically, using a large household-
level dataset from the Life in Transition-III survey,
we rely on a control function approach that allows
us to distinguish between the role of former party
membership and self-selection for entrepreneurial
outcomes in CEE, 25 years after the fall of
communism.
We contribute to and substantially extend two
main strands of literature in economics and business.
First, and most importantly, we add to the scarce
empirical literature on the determinants of the indi-
vidual entrepreneurship decision in CEE (Aidis et al.
2008; Djankov et al. 2005; Nikolova and Simroth
2015), by focusing on the role of political connec-
tions as proxied by former Communist party mem-
bership. Specifically, we are the first to offer a
causal estimate of the relationship using a represen-
tative sample of transition economies, rather than
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Russia, as in seminal papers by Aidis et al. (2008)
and Djankov et al. (2005).1 In addition, the avail-
ability of the entrepreneurship module in the 2016
Life in Transition (LiTS) survey allows us to distin-
guish between entrepreneurial trial, failure, and suc-
cess, which is a unique feature of our research. We
find that former Communist party membership has
facilitated business set-up but not business longevi-
ty. Our results also suggest that people with unob-
servable traits linked to entrepreneurship, such as
motivation and entrepreneurial ability, were less
likely to join the former ruling party.
Second, and more broadly, we add to the growing
literature on the medium- and long-term consequences
of socialism and the former Communist party on socio-
economic outcomes, such as education, corruption, and
trust (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007; Ivlevs and
Hinks 2018; Lippmann and Senik 2018; Nikolova et al.
2019; Rainer and Siedler 2009). Specifically, we show
that 25 years after the fall of socialist regimes, personal
and family links to the former Communist party still
matter to entrepreneurship.
2 Conceptual framework and related literature
We outline three channels through which former Com-
munist party links may still influence individual entre-
preneurial outcomes today: the legacy of communism,
social capital, and labor market discrimination.
First, the communist regimes generally thwarted pri-
vate enterprise and self-initiative, which are conducive
to entrepreneurship (Aidis et al. 2008; Estrin et al. 2006;
Neimanis 1997). Therefore, people exposed to commu-
nism were generally less likely to develop entrepreneur-
ial skills and less able to start and successfully run
businesses after the regime change (Tyson et al. 1994).
Nevertheless, in many countries, the regime tolerated
some unlicensed entrepreneurial activities related to the
private use of state machinery or raw materials for
small-scale private commercial activities (Dallago
2017; Smallbone and Welter 2001). In state-owned
enterprises, it was necessary to engage in illegal activi-
ties to circumvent the shortages of the planned economy
or to engage in bribing and corruption. Procuring mate-
rials and equipment was difficult amidst the shortages of
the planned economy, and managers, who were often
Communist cadres, engaged in these activities them-
selves to avoid disrupting the production process
(Dallago 2017). For instance, the system of elite ex-
change of mutual favors to tackle shortages and circum-
vent formal procedures during communism—blat—
was fundamental for entrepreneurial activities in transi-
tion (Aidis et al. 2008; Ledeneva 1998; Smallbone and
Welter 2001). Moreover, communist elites had access to
foreign currency with which they paid for shortage of
goods. This facilitated their access to black and gray
markets (Matthews 2011). Furthermore, Aidis and
Adachi (2007) document that “friendly ties” with the
local authorities are important complements or substi-
tutes to bribing to ensure business success in Russia.
Therefore, paradoxically, dealing with the shortages of
the planned economy allowed these former Communist
cadres to develop the entrepreneurial and problem-
solving skills needed to create and manage their own
companies and deal with competition. From this per-
spective, people with former Communist party links
may be more likely to have started a business and
succeeded in running one.
Second, the network of former Communist cadres
provided political, social, and financial capital and
guarded against malfunctioning political and economic
institutions. Political control of economic activity, often
by the same former Communist elites, continued
throughout the transition process (Johnson et al. 1997;
Pakulski et al. 1996). Shortly after the regime change,
managers of former state-owned enterprises and those
close to politics privatized these businesses by purchas-
ing them at low prices (Estrin et al. 2009; Hamm et al.
2012; Shelley 1992; Stoica 2004). As such, those with
connections to the Communist party typically got a head
start and became “nomenclatura entrepreneurs” (Estrin
et al. 2006; Filatotchev et al. 1994; Smallbone and
Welter 2001). However, business managers with a for-
mer Communist party membership background are less
aggressive competitors than those without party associ-
ations, meaning that former Communists are less likely
to be engaged in consumer fraud or predatory pricing
(Brouthers et al. 2008; Neimanis 1997). This can be
explained by their higher risk aversion developed under
1 The control function analysis includes the following countries: Po-
land, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Alba-
nia, the seven successor states of Yugoslavia (Bosnia andHerzegovina,
Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montene-
gro, Slovenia, and Serbia), the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania), and Moldova. The first part of the paper shows results
using all transition economies, including the former USSR. The
LiTS-III did not poll Turkmenistan.
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the communist ideology and their desire to maintain the
status quo and their own benefits (Neimanis 1997). This
suggests that despite being successful in the set-up
phase, former Communist party members may be less
successful in maintaining their business in the long-run,
as compared to those without former party affiliation.
Furthermore, former Communist party membership
matters for current entrepreneurial outcomes through
guarding against dysfunctional institutions, which are
still notable in some transition economies. Given the
weak enforcement of property rights, business networks
and trust-based informal institutions may substitute for
the formal rule of law (Granovetter 1985; Nooteboom
2007; Smallbone and Welter 2001). Such networks
could also protect their members against extortion from
the mafia or local authorities, destruction of their phys-
ical capital, and the lack of enforcement of contracts
(Berkowitz and DeJong 2005).
In addition, former ruling party networks may create
entry barriers for outsiders, thus assisting regime in-
siders in securing their position. Therefore, those with-
out connections may be at a disadvantage when starting
and maintaining a business, because they may be vul-
nerable to economic and political insecurity and extor-
tion from public officials or the criminal world (Aidis
et al. 2008).
The final channel through which former cadres and
their descendants may be relatively more likely to start
their own businesses relates to labor market discrimina-
tion. In some former communist countries, such as
Latvia, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland,
people linked to the former ruling regime (for example,
former Communist party members and secret regime
informants) were barred from running for political office
or holding public administration posts (Euractiv 2002;
Szczerbiak 2002; Welsh 1996). Facing no career pros-
pects for high-level political jobs, a scarcity of jobs in
the private sector, and possible stigma attached to being
affiliated with the former ruling regime, Communist
cadres may have had little choice but to become
entrepreneurs.
To our knowledge, no papers on former Communist
party membership and present-day entrepreneurship in
CEE theoretically and empirically distinguish between
self-selection and social network channels. A priori,
discerning the direction of the selection bias is non-
trivial. On the one hand, the Communist party granted
membership to the most able and ambitious individuals
(Geishecker and Haisken-DeNew 2004; Gershenson
and Grossman 2001), which are characteristics linked
with entrepreneurial talent. On the other hand, the Com-
munist party selected members who were loyal and
obedient, which are traits that are less conducive to
entrepreneurship. Our main contribution to the literature
is that we clearly distinguish between selection and the
benefits of party membership as such.
Our paper most closely relates to, yet fundamentally
differs from, the contribution by Aidis et al. (2008),
which examines how the institutional environment and
current business ownership matter for entrepreneurial
development in Russia. The authors find that knowing
entrepreneurs and being a current business owner in-
crease the likelihood of starting a new business in Rus-
sia, which points to the embeddedness of entrepreneur-
ial networks.2 While we build on the insights in Aidis
et al. (2008), we differ in that we do not focus on Russia
but rather on the CEE region. Furthermore, we use a
different proxy for entrepreneurial networks (former
Communist party membership), and most importantly,
we provide causal estimates rather than conditional
correlations.
We also acknowledge two related papers. First,
Djankov et al. (2005) show that parental former Com-
munist party membership is not robustly associated with
business start-ups and longevity in Russia. Meanwhile,
parental education and having entrepreneurial friends
and family are positively associated with being an
entrepreneur. Second, in a contribution examining the
role of religious diversity and entrepreneurship in CEE
and Central Asia, Nikolova and Simroth (2015) use
former Communist party membership as a control var-
iable and find that former Communist party ties are
positively associated with entrepreneurial trials, but not
with successful business set-up. Nikolova and Simroth
(2015) only mention the Communist party finding in
passing, do not explore the channels and mechanisms
behind the relationship, and provide only cross-sectional
insights. Importantly, because they rely on an earlier
data wave that did not have the entrepreneurship mod-
ule, Nikolova and Simroth (2015) only examine the
probability of being self-employed. By contrast, we
examine several stages of the business venture creation
and survival process.
2 Based on the 1993 survey of individuals in six CEE countries, Earle
and Sakova (1999) find that the probability of being self-employed is
uncorrelated with former Communist party membership, but with
individual education, family wealth, and pre-communist family busi-
ness holding.
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3 Data, variables, and estimation strategy
3.1 Data
We use cross-sectional nationally representative data
from the Life in Transition-III survey (LiTS-III),3 col-
lected by the European Bank of Reconstruction and
Development and the World Bank in 2015/2016. The
survey covered 29 post-socialist countries of CEE and
Central Asia (including Mongolia), as well as Turkey,
Greece, Cyprus, Germany, and Italy. Information on
former Communist party membership was only collect-
ed in post-socialist states. The survey excluded
Turkmenistan.
In each country, the LiTS-III conducted 1500 face-
to-face interviews. Households were selected according
to a two-stage clustered stratified sampling procedure.
In the first stage, the frame of primary sampling units
was established using information on local electoral
territorial units. In the second stage, a random walk
fieldwork procedure was used to select households
within primary sampling units. Further information
about the survey design and implementation are avail-
able in the LiTS Annex (EBRD 2016).
3.2 Variables
3.2.1 Outcome variable: entrepreneurial activity
A unique feature of the LiTS-III is that it contains
detailed information on respondents’ past and present
entrepreneurial activities. Our dependent variable
(started business) is based on responses to the question
“Have you ever tried to set up a business?,” with possi-
ble answers “Yes, I have set up my current business,”
“Yes, I set up a business in the past but I am no longer
involved in it or it is no longer operational,” “Yes. I tried
to set up a business and did not succeed (in setting it
up),” and “No.”
3.2.2 Main explanatory variable: former communist
party membership
Our key independent variable captures connections with
the former Communist party based on whether respon-
dents themselves, their parents, or other familymembers
were party members prior to 1989/1991.4 First, the
variable any personal or family link to the former Com-
munist party takes value 1 when the respondent has a
personal or family connection with the former Commu-
nist party and 0 otherwise. Next, we created three sep-
arate dichotomous variables measuring the following:
(i) individuals who themselves were party members; (ii)
the children of former party members; and (iii) the
relatives (other than children) of former party members.
These categories can overlap because the respondent
can be a former party member themselves and at the
same time have parents or relatives who were also party
members. About 21% of respondents in our analysis
sample report links to the former Communist party,
ranging from 39% in Montenegro to 12% in Hungary.
3.2.3 Control variables
Our regressions include standard control variables used
in the entrepreneurship literature (e.g., Aidis et al. 2008;
Block et al. 2015; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2007; Djankov
et al. 2005; Estrin et al. 2013a, b; Nikolova and Simroth
2015). Specifically, we add to our regressions three sets
of control variables. First, the set of individual- and
household-level controls consists of the respondent’s
gender, age and its square, ethnic minority status, reli-
gious affiliation, retirement and disability status, respon-
dent’s height, respondent’s education, a wealth index
based on information about household assets, employ-
ment status, marital status, household size, number of
children under 18, subjective health assessment, risk
attitudes, current membership of any political party,
parental education, and the number of books at home
during the respondent’s childhood. Second, the set of
geography-related controls consists of the urbanity sta-
tus (capital, urban-not-capital, rural), latitude, longitude,
and elevation of the respondent’s place of residence.
Finally, to account for all possible country-level influ-
ences and capture within-country relationships between
3 The two previous waves of this (repeated cross-sectional) survey
were conducted in 2006 (Life in Transition-I) and 2010 (Life in
Transition-II). We chose the latest (2015/2016) wave for our study,
as we wanted to see the effects of former Communist party member-
ship over the longest possible time horizon. Also, a set of detailed
questions on entrepreneurial activity as well as the geolocation of
respondents were only available in the third wave of the survey.
4 The Soviet Union broke down in 1991, while in most satellite
countries of Eastern Europe the communist regimes fell in 1989–1990.
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former Communist party membership and entrepreneur-
ship, we include country-fixed effects.5
To avoid bias from dropping observations with miss-
ing information, we create an additional category for
missing information where the share of missing obser-
vations for a particular categorical variable is greater
than 1%. The only continuous variable with a share of
missing observations higher than 1% is that of respon-
dents’ height (11% missing observations); here we cre-
ate within-country height tertiles and treat the variable as
categorical with missing observations being the fourth
category. The missing category for these variables has
no particular interpretation but serves to preserve the
number of observations. The summary statistics on all
variables used in the analysis is available in Table S1 in
the Supplementary Information file.6
3.3 Estimation strategy
We model the entrepreneurship outcome started busi-
ness of each individual i living in country j as follows:
Started businessij ¼ β0 þ β1 Communist partyij
þ X 0ijγ þ εij ð1Þ
where Communist party captures personal or familial
ties to the former Communist party, X is a vector of
control variables described above, and ε is the sto-
chastic error term. Given the likely interdependence
of respondent outcomes at the local level, we cluster
the standard errors at the primary sampling unit
(PSU) level. Given the categorical and unordered
nature of the dependent variable, we rely on a mul-
tinomial logit estimator. The underlying assumption
of the multinomial logit model is the independence
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), i.e., the assumption
that the relative probability of choosing between two
options is independent of additional alternatives in
the choice set. We have tested for the IIA assump-
tion and found that in our case it is not violated.7
The parameter β1 captures the association between
former Communist party membership and entrepreneurial
activity rather than a causal effect. The Communist party
variable is potentially endogenous, meaning that β1 may
not reflect the true causal effect of party membership on
entrepreneurship but rather self-selection into entrepre-
neurship across households. For example, individuals liv-
ing in households with certain family environments, or
observed or unobserved characteristics related to motiva-
tion or ability, may bemore likely to both be or be linked to
a former party member and start a business.8
To mitigate endogeneity issues and identify causal
effects, we employ a control function approach, a tech-
nique that is similar to the instrumental variable approach
(Petrin and Train 2010; Rivers and Vuong 1988;
Wooldridge 2015), and suitable for non-linear models,
such as the multinomial logit that we use in our analysis.9
Sometimes referred to as a two-stage residual inclusion
(2SRI) (Terza et al. 2008), this approach necessitates one
or more variables—instruments—that are highly correlat-
ed with the endogenous regressor (former Communist
par ty membership) and affect the outcome
(entrepreneurship) only through the endogenous regressor.
In the first stage, the exogenous variation brought by the
instruments also induces variation in the generalized resid-
uals, which serve as control functions (Wooldridge 2015).
Including the control functions in the second stage renders
the endogenous independent variable (former Communist
party membership) plausibly exogenous. The advantage of
the control function approach in our case is that it also
handles non-linear endogenous variables.
Following Terza et al. (2008), we estimate a first-
stage auxiliary regression using a generalized linear
model, with a binomial family and probit link, whereby
the potentially endogenous regressor (i.e., former Com-
munist party membership) is explained by the instru-
ments and all the control variables. Next, we include the
5 For brevity, we only report the tables with the full set of controls but
alternative specifications are available upon request.
6 We have tested for multicollinearity (see Tables S2 and S3). VIFs for
the majority of regressors are below 10, suggesting that
multicollinearity is not an issue. As expected, VIFs for the age variable
and its square are high (44–47). VIFs for lower secondary education,
upper secondary education, latitude, and the Estonia dummy are be-
tween 10 and 17. A closer inspection reveals that education levels are
correlated with own and parental education levels, and latitude is
correlated with country dummies (including Estonia). Taking this
information into account and given a large sample size, we decided
not to exclude/combine any variables.
7 To test for IIA, we used the suest Hausman test, which is a part of the
user-written command mlogtest in Stata (Long and Freese 2014). The
results of the test are provided in Table S4 of Supplementary
Information.
8 While we include a set of control variables that mitigate the
endogeneity related to self-selection, we lack important control vari-
ables related to parental occupation, which could also result in
endogeneity due to omitted variables bias.
9 Terza et al. (2008) show that in a non-linear model, such as multi-
nomial logit, the standard two-stage least squares estimation will
produce inconsistent results.
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predicted first-stage residuals, along with the endoge-
nous regressor, in the second stage estimation. The
standard errors in the second stage and the reported
marginal effects are based on bootstrapped clustered
replications. The coefficient estimate on the endogenous
regressor in the second stage represents the unbiased
effect of the former Communist party on entrepreneurial
activity, while that on the predicted residuals captures
the endogeneity bias. We estimate the following system
of equations:
1st stage : Communist partyij
¼ γ0 þ γ1Instrumentsij þ X
0
ijπþ uij ð2Þ
2nd stage : Started businessij
¼ eβ0 þ eβ1Communist partyij þ αuestij
þ X 0ijeγ þ ζij ð3Þ
where, for each individual i in country j, X denotes a
vector of all control variables (including country-fixed
effects), u is the error term of the first-stage regression,
uest is the predicted residual from the first-stage equa-
tion, and ζ is the error term in the second-stage
regression.
One advantage of the control function approach is
that the inclusion of the residuals provides a Hausman
test of the null hypothesis that the Communist party
variable is exogenous (Bollen et al. 1995; Wooldridge
2015). Specifically, the statistical significance of the
coefficient estimate on the predicted residuals, denoted
by α in Eq. (3), indicates that the Communist party
membership variable is endogenous, implying that the
control function rather than simple multinomial regres-
sion results should be used for interpretation.
Following Ivlevs and Hinks (2018), we instrument
personal and family links to the former Communist
party with information about the involvement of respon-
dents’ family members in the Second World War
(WWII). Ivlevs and Hinks (2018) summarize evidence
showing that across the former socialist world, WWII
veterans (and in many cases civilians who were affected
Fig. 1 Distribution of respondents who have set up a business,
tried to set up a business, failed to set up a business, and never tried
to set up a business, by former Communist party links. Source:
Authors’ calculations based on data from the LiTS-III. Notes: The
figure summarizes the mean of the proportion of responses to the
question “Have you ever tried to set up a business?,”with possible
answers “Yes, I have set up my current business,” “Yes, I set up a
business in the past but I am no longer involved in it or it is no
longer operational,” “Yes, I tried to set up a business and did not
succeed (in setting it up),” and “No”
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by war) were encouraged and given priority to join the
Communist party and take leading positions in the gov-
ernment and various administrative bodies. Our expec-
tation is that people who themselves, or whose parents
and grandparents, fought in, or were otherwise affected
by, WWII would be more likely to have either personal
affiliation or family links to the former Communist party
(instrument relevance).
The assumption about instrument exogeneity, that
being affected by WWII (or being the descendant of
such people) is uncorrelated with the error term,
necessitates further discussion. While this assump-
tion is fundamentally untestable, we provide histor-
ical arguments about its plausibility. It is unlikely
that when WWII started, people joined the army
because they thought it would make it easier to join
Table 1 Distribution of respondents who have set up a business, tried to set up a business, failed to set up a business, and never tried to set





Failed at setting up a
business
Never tried
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
All post-socialist countries, N = 42,548 0.055 0.229 0.035 0.185 0.032 0.176 0.877 0.328
Former Soviet Union, N = 22,104 0.055 0.228 0.040 0.196 0.040 0.197 0.864 0.342
Balkans, N = 14,453 0.055 0.229 0.027 0.162 0.024 0.153 0.894 0.308
Visegrad, N = 4463 0.055 0.229 0.027 0.162 0.024 0.153 0.894 0.308
Baltics, N = 4464 0.057 0.233 0.062 0.241 0.026 0.158 0.855 0.352
Analysis sample in Table 3, N = 20,922 0.055 0.228 0.036 0.187 0.024 0.152 0.885 0.319
Cyprus, Greece, Germany, Italy, Turkey, N = 7504 0.055 0.228 0.036 0.187 0.024 0.152 0.885 0.319
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the LiTS-III
The table summarizes the mean of the proportion of responses to the question “Have you ever tried to set up a business?,” with possible
answers “Yes, I have set up my current business,” “Yes, I set up a business in the past but I am no longer involved in it or it is no longer
operational,” “Yes, I tried to set up a business and did not succeed (in setting it up),” and “No.” The Balkans sample includes Croatia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania. The Visegrad countries are Poland,
Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Hungary. The Baltics are Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The former Soviet Union countries are Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and
Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan is not included in the LiTS-III. The analysis sample in Table 3 group includes Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, the seven successor states of Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Slovenia, and Serbia), the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and Moldova
Table 2 Selected summary statistics, analysis sample
No links to the Communist party, N = 16,594 Links to the Communist party, N = 4328
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Age* 50.284 17.772 55.665 16.449
Male* 0.441 0.497 0.465 0.499
Tertiary (less than bachelor’s degree)* 0.058 0.234 0.069 0.254
Bachelor’s degree* 0.094 0.292 0.124 0.330
Master’s or PhD* 0.051 0.220 0.069 0.254
Wealth index (scale 1–8)* 5.455 1.699 5.461 1.670
Had more than 200 books in childhood* 0.072 0.259 0.111 0.314
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the LiTS-III
*Designates statistically significant difference in means between those with and those without former Communist party membership links at
1% or lower
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Tried but failed to set up a
business
Never tried to set up a
business
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any link to the Communist
party
0.002 0.012*** 0.007*** − 0.021***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Individual/household-level
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geography controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,922
Wald χ2 2838.290
Prob > χ2 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.144
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the LiTS-III
Standard errors, clustered at the primary sampling unit level, in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Individual/household-level controls include gender, age and its square, ethnic minority status, religious affiliation, being retired, being
disabled, height, education level, wealth index, employment status, marital status, household size, number of children under 18, subjective
health assessment, risk attitudes, membership of (any) political party, parental education, and the number of books at home during the
respondent’s childhood. Geography controls include the urbanity status (capital, urban-not-capital, rural), latitude, longitude, and elevation
of the respondent’s place of residence. See Supplementary Information for complete econometric output
Fig. 2 Links to the former Communist party and present-day
entrepreneurial activity, multinomial logit marginal effects.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the LiTS-III.
Notes: The figure shows the effect of former Communist party
membership on the predicted probability of each value of the
outcome variable. The reported coefficient estimates are reported
as marginal effects based on multinomial logistic regressions with
standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit level. See
Table 2 notes for the list of individual and geography controls
included in the regressions and Table 1 notes for the composition
of country groups. Complete econometric output, on which the
graph is based, is available on request
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the ruling party during or after the war which, in
turn, would help them to establish businesses after a
regime change. However, some people might have
wished to go to war in anticipation of joining the
party and benefiting from the advantages that party
membership brings (for example, be in power/
managerial positions and exploit advantageous net-
works). If the personal characteristics of such indi-
viduals are linked with traits that determine the
l ike l ihood and success of en t repreneur ia l
activities (Caliendo et al. 2014), the instruments
may not be exogenous. To ensure that these consid-
erations pose no threat to our instrument’s validity,
following Ivlevs and Hinks (2018), we concentrate
on the CEE countries that did not have communist
regimes before WWII. This allows us to rule out the
possibility that people in these countries joined the
war effort in order to become members of the Com-
munist party during or after the war. There are 18
s u c h c o u n t r i e s i n o u r s amp l e—Po l a n d ,
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bul-
garia, Albania, the seven successor states of Yugo-
slavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Monte-
negro, Slovenia, and Serbia), the Baltic States (Es-
tonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and Moldova.10 Our
analysis sample therefore only includes this set of
countries.
We measure respondents’, their parents’, and
grandparents’ involvement in WWII using informa-
tion from two survey questions: (i) “Were you, your
parents or any of your grandparents physically in-
jured or were your parents or any of your grandpar-
ents killed during WWII?” and (ii) “Did you, your
parents or any of your grandparents have to move as
a result of WWII?,” with possible answers “Yes”
and “No.” We construct two binary variables, killed/
injured in WWII and displaced as a result of
WWII,11 and expect both to be positively correlated
with personal or family links to the former
Communist party. We note that apart from fighting
in WWII, these variables would also capture broader
WWII effects on civilians. However, in many
cases—for example, relocation to a labor camp or
part ic ipat ing in an underground resis tance
movement—civilians affected by WWII would also
receive preferential treatment after the war.
4 Results
4.1 Summary statistics
Figure 1 and Table 1 below demonstrate that overall,
about 5.5% of respondents are current business owners,
3.6% started a business that subsequently closed down,
2.6% failed at starting a business, and about 88% were
never involved in a start-up. These statistics are similar
across the group of post-socialist countries and also
comparable to the figures for the non-transition coun-
tries in the LiTS-III (Cyprus, Greece, Germany, Italy,
Turkey, N = 7504) (Table 1).
Table 2 further demonstrates differences in the
characteristics of respondents with and without links
to the former Communist party. Specifically, those
with former ruling party ties tend to be older, are
more likely to be male, more educated, and to have
grown up in a home with more than 200 books. We
expect that these differences matter for the selection
of households into entrepreneurship based on former
political connections.
Figure 1 offers the first glimpse into differences
in entrepreneurship outcomes according to former
Communist party membership. Evidently, those con-
nected to the former ruling elites are more likely to
have tried and succeeded in setting up a business
than individuals without such connections. Never-
theless, in subsequent analyses, we test whether
these raw differences withstand robust econometric
analyses.
4.2 Main results
Table 3 reports the results of the multinomial logit
model without accounting for the endogeneity of the
Communist party variable. For brevity, we only report
the marginal effects of the focal regressors; complete
econometric output, including the raw multinomial logit
coefficients and a commentary on the control variables,
10 We include the three Baltic States and Moldova as they had very
short exposure (1 year) to communist rule before WWII started. Our
results are unchanged if these four countries are excluded from the
analysis. However, as the three Baltic States and Moldova witnessed
high levels of state-managed immigration from other USSR republics,
predominantly Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, we exclude from the
analysis respondents of Russian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian ethnic
origin.
11 Importantly, 15% of respondents provided no answers to these
questions and are excluded from the analysis.
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is available in the Supplementary Information file
(Table S5).
The results in Column (1) of Table 3 suggest that
having personal or family links to the former Com-
munist party is a statistically insignificant predictor
of having set up and running a business at the time
of the interview. Meanwhile, people with former
Communist party links are 1.2 percentage points
more likely to report that they set up a business in
the past but were no longer involved in it or the
business was no longer operational (Column (2)),
0.7 percentage points more likely to report that they
had tried to set up a business in the past but did not
succeed in doing so (Column (3)), and 2.1 percent-
age points less likely to report that they had never
tried to set up a business (Column (4)).
The results presented in Table 3 hold across all post-
socialist country contexts. Specifically, we replicated
the analyses in Table 3 for the full sample of post-
socialist countries in the LiTS-III, as well as for the
Balkans, Baltics, Visegrad, and former Soviet Union
countries. Figure 2, which summarizes the results for
these country contexts, demonstrates that the relation-
ship between former Communist party membership and
entrepreneurship are nearly universal in the transition
region. Interestingly, however, former Communist party
membership in the Visegrad countries (Poland,
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) is not associ-
ated with entrepreneurial trial and success. Given that
some forms of entrepreneurship existed in these coun-
tries before the collapse of communism (Dallago 2017),
nascent Visegrad entrepreneurs likely relied on their
past experiences rather than political connections and
informal networks.
Overall, our results imply that people with links to
the former Communist party are more likely to report
having tried—successfully or unsuccessfully—to set up
a business in the past, although they may not necessarily
be involved in the business at the time of the interview.
This finding holds across the transition region and is not
Table 4 Links to the former Communist party and present-day entrepreneurial activity, instrumental variable results
1st stage 2nd stage
Dependent variable – started business






Tried but failed to set
up a business
Never tried to set up
a business
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Any link to the Communist
party
– 0 .047 0.077*** 0.063*** − 0.187***
(0.031) (0.021) (0.013) (0.027)
1st stage predicted residuals – − 0.045 − 0.066*** − 0.057*** 0.170***
(0.031) (0.021) (0.014) (0.025)
Individual/household-level
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geography-related controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes





– – – –









AIC/Pseudo R2 0.916 0.146
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the LiTS-III
Standard errors, clustered at the primary sampling unit level, in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The first stage of the
instrumental variable model is estimated with the generalized linear model (GLM) technique, using a binomial family and a probit link and
the reported coefficient estimates are average marginal effects. The second stage is estimated with a multinomial logit and this table reports
the average marginal effects. The second stage standard errors are bootstrapped. See Table 2 notes for the list of individual and geography
controls included in the regressions. Complete econometric output is available on request
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Tried but failed to set up a
business
Never tried to set up a
business
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Former Communist party
member
0.012 0.014*** 0.005 − 0.031***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010)
Child of Communist party
member
− 0.001 0.009*** 0.004 − 0.012*
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Relative of Communist party
member
− 0.006 0.004 0.006 − 0.004
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
Individual/household-level
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geography-related controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,922
Wald χ2 2868.490
Prob > χ2 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.144
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the LiTS-III
Standard errors, clustered at the primary sampling unit level, in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
See Table 2 notes for the list of individual and geography controls included in the regressions. Complete econometric output is available on request
Fig. 3 Links to the former Communist party and entrepreneurial
activity, by age, multinomial logit marginal effects. Notes: the
graphs show multinomial logit marginal effects and their 95%
confidence intervals calculated after estimating the baseline model
(Table 3) with the interaction term between the links to the Com-
munist party variable and age
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particular to the CEE. Nevertheless, these results repre-
sent associations between links to the former Commu-
nist party and present-day entrepreneurial activities and
reflect, among other things, the causal effect of former
party membership on present-day entrepreneurship as
well as the self-selection into the party of people with
specific characteristics that also affect the likelihood of
undertaking entrepreneurial activities.
To disentangle the causal effect of party links from
self-selection, we now turn to the control function re-
sults reported in Table 4. Both instruments capturing
involvement in WWII are positive and individually
significant at the 1% level in the first-stage regression
(Column 1), indicating that being affected by WWII, or
having a family member who was affected (either killed/
injured or displaced), strongly predicts links to the for-
mer Communist party. Instrument relevance is further
confirmed by the F-test of excluded instruments, the
value of which (206.57) exceeds the commonly accept-
ed threshold value of 10.12
The second-stage results (Columns 2–5 of Table 2)
reveal statistically significant coefficients of the 1st
stage residuals for all outcomes of the started business
variable except having set up a current business, indi-
cating that the Communist party variable is indeed en-
dogenous. When we account for endogeneity, former
Communist party ties increase the likelihood of having
set up a business in the past but being no longer involved
in it (or the business being non-operational) by 7.7
percentage points, having unsuccessfully tried to set up
a business by 6.3 percentage points, and decrease the
likelihood of having never tried to set up a business by
18.7 percentage points.
Concerning having set up and being involved in a
current business (Column 2 of Table 4), a statisti-
cally insignificant estimate of the 1st stage predicted
residuals implies no endogeneity for this outcome
and that the correlational result of Column 1 of
Table 3 should be used. We thus conclude that
former Communist party membership has no effect
on having set up and currently running a business.
Taken together, the results suggest that former Com-
munist party ties were indeed instrumental in facil-
itating business set-ups. However, these political ties
did not ensure that these businesses were on average
more successful in the long term (25 years after the
regime change) or that the people who set them up
would still be running them.
At the same time, the negative and statistically signif-
icant estimate of the first-stage residuals variable suggests
that it is people with traits that make them less entrepre-
neurial who tended to self-select into the Communist
party. Put differently, had the Communist party and the
communist regime not existed, we would observe that
these people, conditional on other control variables, were
less—not more—likely to start businesses.
4.3 Additional analyses
This section explores whether the main relationships we
identify depend on whether the connection to the former
ruling party is personal or familial, and whether Com-
munist connections matter less for the business out-
comes of younger respondents. In additional analyses,
we investigate whether beliefs about the nature of suc-
cess and current political party membership mediate the
main effects.
First, we split the Communist party variable ac-
cording to whether the respondent was (1) him/
herself a former party member; (2) the child of a
former party member; or (3) the relative of a former
party member. The results of the correlational mod-
el, reported in Table 5, show that it is the former
party members and their children who are driving
the results13: they are more likely (by 1.4 and 0.9
percentage points, respectively) to report that they
set up a business in the past but are no longer
involved in it, and less likely (by 3.1 and 1.2 per-
centage points, respectively) to report that they have
never tried to set up a business.14
Furthermore, we explore whether connections to
the former cadres are equally important along the
age distribution by interacting the links to the former
Communist party variable.15 Fig. 3 demonstrates
that older respondents with former Communist party
links are relatively more likely to have set up a
business in the past that is no longer operational,
12 The full econometric output of the first stage results is available in
Table S6.
13 Former Communist party members in our sample are on average
65 years old, compared to an average age of 53 years for the children of
party cadres.
14 We formally tested the difference in the coefficient estimates be-
tween the “Former Communist party member” and “Child of former
Communist party member” variables and found that they are not
statistically different from each other in any of the outcomes.
15 See Supplementary Information Table S7 for econometric output.
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and less likely to say that they never tried to set up a
business. Our results imply, therefore, that former
ruling party ties are less important for the entrepre-
neurial outcomes of younger cohorts compared to
their older counterparts.
Next, we investigate whether the relationship be-
tween former Communist party ties and present-day
entrepreneurship depends on the individual values
that people hold. To that end, we make use of a
LiTS-III question about the most important factor to
succeed in life, with possible answers including ef-
fort and hard work, intelligence and skills, political
connections, and breaking the law. First, we find that
people with former Communist party links are less
likely to say that effort and skills are important and
more likely to say that political connections and
breaking the law matter for success, compared to
those wi thou t such t i e s ( see Tab le S8 of
Supplementary Information).16
We then complement the model in Eq. (1) with respon-
dents’ values related to success in life as well as the
interactions between these factors and the Communist party
variable. The results, reported in Fig. 4 and Supplementary
Table S10 show that belief in political connections often
underlies current entrepreneurial outcomes among former
Fig. 4 Links to the former Communist party and entrepreneurial
activity, by beliefs in factors to succeed in life, multinomial logit
marginal effects. Notes: the graphs show multinomial logit mar-
ginal effects and their 95% confidence intervals calculated after
estimating the baseline model (Table 3) with the interaction term
between the links to the Communist party variable and beliefs in
factors to succeed in life
16 We have also checked if the value orientations of people with and
without links to the former Communist party are different between
workers in different industries. In these analyses, we consider all types
of workers and not just entrepreneurs. The results, reported in Table S9
of the Supplementary Information, show that respondents with former
party links who work in the construction, manufacturing, and services
sectors are less likely to say that effort and hardwork are important to
succeed in life than those working in the same industries but without
such ties. Meanwhile, those with former Communist links working in
the manufacturing sector are more likely to say that political connec-
tions are important.
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cadres. Specifically, people with former party links who
believe that life success comes from intelligence and skills
or by breaking the law are more likely to run a current
business than former party members with other value ori-
entations. Belief in personal effort and political connections
among former party cadres are also associated with having
a past business venture, which is no longer operational.
Finally, former Communist party members who believe in
intelligence and skills as a means to get ahead in life are
more likely to have failed at setting up a business.
Finally, we explore whether current party connec-
tions amplify the power of former Communist con-
nections in determining current entrepreneurial out-
comes. Our baseline specification, reported in detail
in Table S5, reveals that respondents who are cur-
rent political party members are more likely to re-
port running a current business, having set up a
business that is no longer operational, and having
tried but failed to set up a business. They are also
less likely to say that they have never tried to set up
a business. To investigate the possibility that past
party connections transition to present ones, we add
to our baseline model (Eq. 1) an interaction term
between these two variables. The results, reported in
Table S11 and Fig. 5 below, show that the main
results we report do not depend on current political
party affiliation. The coefficient estimates on the
interaction terms in Table S11 are statistically not
significant and the confidence intervals in Fig. 5
denoting the effect of the former Communist party
on current entrepreneurship according to current po-
litical membership are overlapping. As such, these
results imply that the social capital associated with
links to the former Communist party is independent
of current political party affiliations.
5 Conclusion
This paper is the first causal exploration of the long-term
consequences of former Communist party ties for entre-
preneurship in the post-socialist region. Our results
demonstrate that the nature of entrepreneurship in CEE
is path-dependent. Specifically, ties to the former ruling
Fig. 5 Links to the former Communist party and entrepreneurial
activity, by current membership of any political party, multinomial
logit marginal effects. Notes: the graphs show multinomial logit
marginal effects and their 95% confidence intervals calculated
after estimating the baseline model (Table 3) with the interaction
term between the links to the Communist party variable and
current party membership of any political party
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elites are instrumental for entrepreneurial start-up but
not for entrepreneurial success. We also show that those
with less favorable traits such as lower risk aversion,
lower ability, or lower entrepreneurial aptitude, were in
fact more likely to join the party. In subsequent analy-
ses, we also show that people with former Communist
party links believe that success depends on political
connections and breaking the law rather than effort
and skills. These findings raise questions about the
moral dimensions of business practice in the region,
and about whether the playing field has truly been
leveled 25 years after the fall of the Communist regimes.
Our findings can be interpreted in one of two ways
depending on whether former Communists and their
children were pushed or pulled into entrepreneurship.
On the one hand, the fact that the former Communist
party allowed for a head start in entrepreneurial activity
may suggest that the party had laid the foundations of
inequality of opportunity in terms of entrepreneurship.
On the other hand, our findings could be indicative of
the fact that the least capable former Communist party
members (or their children) became entrepreneurs and
then subsequently closed down their businesses due to a
lack of formal alternatives or discrimination in the labor
market. In other words, these individuals may have been
pushed into entrepreneurship out of necessity. In both
cases, the fact that the former elites were negatively
selected on traits such as ability and entrepreneurial
aptitude, combined with the current low levels of entre-
preneurship in the transition region, suggests that the
negative consequences of communism for entrepreneur-
ship were two-fold. First, communism had a long-
lasting damaging effect on entrepreneurship by encour-
aging a culture of state-reliance rather than self-initia-
tive, which is inimical to free enterprise. Second, despite
its focus on equality and egalitarianism, paradoxically,
communism laid the foundations of unequal access to
entrepreneurship by excluding those with resources and
connections from starting a business, at least in the
initial stages of democracy. From a social viewpoint,
the fact that the least capable people attempted to start a
business and subsequently failed while also crowding
out people without elite connections may suggest a
social welfare loss.
Our study also offers opportune avenues for future
research, such as distinguishing the rank of the former
party member (i.e., a party member vs. a party official)
and unpacking the particular traits that made individuals
or households more likely to become former party
members but at the same time made them less
entrepreneurial.
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